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 JUSTICE ON APPEAL IN CRIMINAL CASES: 
A TWENTIETH-CENTURY PERSPECTIVE 
PAUL D. CARRINGTON* 
I welcome the opportunity to participate in this symposium so that I may 
present once again, and not merely for old times‘ sake, a view of the role of 
appellate courts that was once widely shared and has now been dismissed by 
many judges as antique.  I write chiefly of federal courts, but the same 
considerations arise in the conduct of appeals in state courts. 
THE 1976 SETTING 
From 1971 to 1976, I worked with Dan Meador and Maurice Rosenberg, 
and with a very elegant group of judges and lawyers organized as the 
Advisory Council for Appellate Justice (Council or Advisory Council).  Our 
Council was summoned into being by the eminent Circuit Judge Al Murrah,
1
 
who was then the director of the new Federal Judicial Center.
2
  Our Council 
was also funded by the National Conference on State Courts
3
 and the Law 
Enforcement Assistance Administration.
4
  All of these organizations were 
then of recent birth and reflected a widely shared ambition to erect a legal 





* Professor of Law, Duke University.  This Essay was presented to a Conference on Criminal 
Appeals at Marquette University Law School on June 15, 2009.  Sara Beale, Lisa Griffin, and 
Michael Tigar offered very helpful comments.  Todd Miller was very helpful in editing and in 
locating the references. 
1. His biography is VON RUSSELL CREEL ET AL., AMERICAN JURIST: THE LIFE OF JUDGE 
ALFRED P. MURRAH (1996). 
2. For a description of the role and functions of the center, see JOSEPH L. EBERSOLE, THE 
FEDERAL JUDICIAL CENTER: A NONTRADITIONAL ORGANIZATION IN THE FEDERAL JUDICIARY OF 
THE UNITED STATES (1979). 
3. For a history of the founding of this organization, see ERICK LOW, THE NATIONAL CENTER 
FOR STATE COURTS: A COMMEMORATIVE HISTORY OF ITS STRUCTURE AND ORGANIZATION IN 
HONOR OF 20 YEARS OF SERVICE TO THE STATE COURTS (1991). 
4. For an account of this program conducted by the Department of Justice, see generally 
MALCOLM M. FEELEY & AUSTIN D. SARAT, THE POLICY DILEMMA: FEDERAL CRIME POLICY AND 
THE LAW ENFORCEMENT ASSISTANCE ADMINISTRATION (1980). 
5. For an account of that vision and its expiration, see ANDREW J.F. MORRIS, THE LIMITS OF 
VOLUNTARISM: CHARITY AND WELFARE FROM THE NEW DEAL THROUGH THE GREAT SOCIETY 
(2009); MARK A. SMITH, THE RIGHT TALK: HOW CONSERVATIVES TRANSFORMED THE GREAT 
SOCIETY INTO THE ECONOMIC SOCIETY (2007); THE GREAT SOCIETY AND THE HIGH TIDE OF 
LIBERALISM (Sidney M. Miksis & Jerome M. Mileur eds., 2005). 
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Several years of regular meetings led to a large national conference in 
1975 held in San Diego and attended by hundreds of the most eminent judges, 
lawyers, and scholars in the nation.
6
  So honorific was our guest list that Wade 
McCree, an eminent circuit judge and member of the Council, and later 
Solicitor General of the United States,
7
 remarked that we would need a 
mortally ill person to take responsibility for selecting those invited to attend 
because he or she would be a target for revenge by hundreds of powerful 
uninvited persons.  Our conference was designed to elevate the profession‘s 
understanding of what was happening to our appellate courts and to advance 
the briefly stated views of the Council that were presented and discussed at 
the conference.  In 1976, Meador, Rosenberg, and I published a book, Justice 
on Appeal, that was intended to express more fully views then widely if not 
universally shared, not only by members of the Advisory Council, but by most 
of the hundreds of eminent attendees at the Conference.  This Essay is a 
reflection on that work and what has happened to it. 
I had myself previously conducted a study of the federal appellate process 
for the American Bar Foundation.  I was in that endeavor advised by an even 
more revered group that included two presidents of the American Bar 
Association (ABA), Bernard Segal
8
 and Leon Jaworski,
9
 and two of the most 
eminent federal judges of the 1960s, Carl McGowan and Thurgood 
Marshall.
10
  Our unanimous 1969 report was an anticipation of the later work 
of the Advisory Council.
11
  By 1976, there had been two other studies of the 
federal courts
12
 that, like the Bar Foundation study, concluded that the federal 
appellate system needed radical reform to protect the integrity of the system 
of correcting errors in both civil and criminal proceedings in United States 
District Courts, a system that had been established in the preceding century. 
The efforts of the Bar Foundation group and the Advisory Council 
 
6. The conferees were presented with ample readings.  See APPELLATE JUSTICE: 1975 (Paul D. 
Carrington et al. eds., 1975) (five volumes published by the National Center for State Courts). 
7. For a personal commentary on Judge McCree, see Sara Sun Beale, Wade H. McCree, Jr., 86 
MICH. L. REV. 217 (1987). 
8. See Robert McG. Thomas Jr., Bernard G. Segal Dies at 89; Lawyer for Rich and Poor, N.Y. 
TIMES, June 5, 1997, at B16. 
9. See generally LEON JAWORSKI, CONFESSION AND AVOIDANCE: A MEMOIR (1979). 
10. There are, of course, numerous biographies of Justice Marshall.  None seem very attentive 
to his career as a circuit judge.  But see RANDALL WALTON BLAND, JUSTICE THURGOOD 
MARSHALL: CRUSADER FOR LIBERALISM: HIS JUDICIAL BIOGRAPHY (1908–1993), at 183–200 
(2001). 
11. AM. BAR FOUND., ACCOMMODATING THE WORKLOAD OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS OF 
APPEALS (1968). 
12. COMM‘N ON REVISION OF THE FED. COURT APPELLATE SYS., STRUCTURE AND INTERNAL 
PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE, reprinted at 67 F.R.D. 195 (1975) (known as the 
Hruska Report); FED. JUDICIAL CTR., REPORT OF THE STUDY GROUP ON THE CASELOAD OF THE 
SUPREME COURT, reprinted at 57 F.R.D. 573 (1972) (known as the Freund Report). 
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proceeded from shared premises.  We were all, in some sense, members of the 
celebrated Great Society that promised ―justice to all.‖  By that phrase, we 
intended transparent enforcement of all legal rights.  We assumed that every 
citizen charged with a serious crime was entitled, if he or she wanted, to a 
public trial by jury at which competent counsel would defend the accused.
13
  
We also assumed that the offender had a right to subject the conduct of that 
proceeding to further scrutiny by high-ranking judges who would, in public, 
bring their mature and disinterested wisdom directly to bear on their 
assessment of the fairness of the public trial.  Indeed, we thought that citizens 
of the Great Society were equally entitled to know who was responsible for 
punishments imposed by law and the factual basis for their decisions.  
Transparency at all levels was in this shared view a moral and political 
imperative. 
Meador, Rosenberg, and I explained our insistence on transparency on 
appeal: 
Appellate justice should be a model for the government‘s 
dealings with citizens.  Appellate courts are the most 
dignified and receptive authorities to which individuals can 
turn to express their legal dissatisfactions in a pointed way, 
with assurance of a direct response.  If these courts do not 
deal directly with litigants, we cannot expect agencies or 
bureaucracies of lesser sensitivity to legal rights to do so.  It 
is therefore important that justice on appeal be visible to all.
14
 
We legal scholars of the Great Society were of course aware that the right 
to appeal a criminal conviction was not written in stone.  Why, our forebears 
in the nineteenth century might have asked, should we bother to allow appeals 
from criminal convictions?  Pursuant to the prohibition on double jeopardy 
stated in the Fifth Amendment,
15
 the forebears did not allow the states or the 
federal government to appeal acquittals.  And the role of the judiciary in 
making criminal law through utterances in opinions of the court must be at 
best modest.  Our federal and state constitutions leave little, if any, room for 
the enforcement of criminal law not enacted by legislatures but made by 
judges in the common law manner.
16
  If Congress, or a state legislature, has 
 
13. The right to counsel emerged in the Scottsboro case in 1932.  Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 
45, 73 (1932). 
14. PAUL D. CARRINGTON ET AL., JUSTICE ON APPEAL, at v (1976). 
15. ―[N]or shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or 
limb.‖  U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
16. Ben Rosenberg discusses the lack of federal criminal common law, while noting several 
exceptions.  Ben Rosenberg, The Growth of Federal Criminal Common Law, 29 AM. J. CRIM. L. 193, 
202 (2002) (―There is no federal criminal common law.  But there is.‖).  Most states have similarly 
attempted to codify common law crimes.  For a brief account of this development, see Francis Barry 
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not clearly stated the prohibitions they mean to impose on our conduct, a court 
has no business prescribing new principles of criminal law.  And in the 
nineteenth century, the procedural rights of those charged with a crime were 
few, save the right to trial by jury.
17
  Given all these circumstances, there was 
not much a convicted defendant could have said, had his appeal been 
permitted.  It was also a likely comfort to those concerned with federal law 
that there were few federal laws and few federal prosecutions. 
The view of the appellate process voiced by many of us in the age of the 
Great Society was first expressed in the late nineteenth century in response to 
this absence of appellate review.  The Judiciary Act of 1889
18
 first established 
the right to appeal a conviction in federal court, but that right was for the 
moment limited to capital cases.  In 1891, the right to appeal was extended to 
all convictions imposed by district courts, and the courts of appeals were 
established to provide a forum for review of all civil and criminal judgments 
of the district courts,
19
 thereby constraining the exercise of what had been 
decried as the ―kingly power‖ of the trial judges in federal courts.20  The 
purpose, indeed the only purpose, of those responsible for creating the United 
States Circuit Courts of Appeals was to provide a system of public 
accountability for federal trial judges; it was only for that reason that 
Congress established appellate courts whose job, indeed whose only job, 
would be not only to correct judges‘ errors but to affirm and support their 
contested decisions.
21
  That remains a vital mission of the appellate court.
22
  In 
1897, six years after their establishment, the Circuit Courts of Appeals were 
given exclusive responsibility for the review of federal convictions.
23
  That 
responsibility was enlarged by the Judiciary Act of 1925,
24
 which greatly 
 
McCarthy, Crimes of Omission in Pennsylvania, 68 TEMP. L. REV. 633, 659–62 (1995) (describing 
the history of legality). 
17. See U.S. CONST. amend. VI; see also, e.g., ALA. CONST. art. I, § 6; MINN. CONST. art. I, 
§ 6; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 24; VA. CONST. art. I, § 8.  
18. Act of Feb. 6, 1889, ch. 113, § 6, 25 Stat. 656, 656. 
19. Act of Mar. 3, 1891, ch. 517, §§ 2, 5, 26 Stat. 826, 826–28. 
20. 21 CONG. REC. 3404 (1890) (remarks of Rep. David Browning Culberson); see also FELIX 
FRANKFURTER & JAMES M. LANDIS, THE BUSINESS OF THE SUPREME COURT 88 (1928) (―No 
wonder that extravagant language, descriptive of tyranny, was employed by responsible lawyers to 
characterize the powers wielded at this time by a single federal judge!‖) . 
21. Indeed, the sole purpose of that Act was to provide a system for correcting error.  See 21 
CONG REC. 3407–08, 10,221–22 (1890) (remarks of Rep. William Campbell Preston Breckinridge 
and remarks of Sen. William Maxwell Evarts, respectively).  On the continuing centrality of that 
purpose, see Chad M. Oldfather, Error Correction, 85 IND. L.J. 49 (2010). 
22. For elaboration of the point, see Paul D. Carrington, The Power of District Judges and the 
Responsibility of Courts of Appeals, 3 GA. L. REV. 507 (1969).  But see Charles Alan Wright, The 
Doubtful Omniscience of Appellate Courts, 41 MINN. L. REV. 751, 779–81 (1957). 
23. Act of Jan. 20, 1897, ch. 68, 29 Stat. 492.   
24. Act of Feb. 13, 1925, ch. 229, 43 Stat. 936, 936–39. 
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extended the Supreme Court‘s discretion to deny petitions for certiorari, 
thereby leaving the error-correction task entirely to the intermediate courts.
25
 
It was not until the second half of the twentieth century that the federal 
and state constitutions, bearing on criminal punishments in state courts, 
became major features of criminal procedure.
26
  The federal constitutional 
provisions had come to be enforced in state court proceedings by means of 
habeas corpus proceedings in federal courts.
27
  This evolution of procedural 
rights greatly increased the complexity and importance of procedural rulings 
prior to trial;
28
 the evolution elevated the importance of effective review of all 
federal convictions, and also appellate review of collateral proceedings in 
which the constitutionality of state court convictions are assessed by federal 
district courts.  Pretrial rulings today also include rulings enforcing numerous 
rights of non-parties pursuant to the Crime Victims‘ Rights Act of 2004.29  
The task assigned to the reviewing court is thus not only to assure the public 
of the sufficiency of evidence presented at trial, but also to certify compliance 
with all the many procedural rules enacted or imposed by constitutions or 
legislation to prevent the abuse of power by governments and prosecutors.  
Forty years ago, the leadership of the profession regarded this complex task as 
the defining mission of our appellate judges in criminal cases. 
The federal courts‘ function of reviewing criminal proceedings in state 
courts pursuant to petitions for writs of habeas corpus has been limited 
somewhat by Congress,
30
 but remains significant.  The Supreme Court has 
lately had to remind courts of appeals that their grudging review of capital 




25. See Arthur D. Hellman, Error Correction, Lawmaking, and the Supreme Court’s Exercise 
of Discretionary Review, 44 U. PITT. L. REV. 795, 797–98 (1983); cf. Rogers v. Mo. Pac. R.R., 352 
U.S. 500, 524–25 (1957) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (criticizing the Court‘s exercise of jurisdiction 
―in the name of ‗doing justice‘ in individual cases‖). 
26. For a brief account of the constitutional law developments, see Developments in the Law—
The Interpretation of State Constitutional Rights, 95 HARV. L. REV. 1324, 1367–98 (1982). 
27. 28 U.S.C. § 2245 (2006).  On the advent of federal review of state convictions in habeas 
corpus proceedings, see generally Evelyn L. Wilson, Federal Habeas Corpus: An Avenue of Relief 
for State Prisoners, 18 S.U. L. REV. 1 (1991); Brian M. Hoffstadt, The Deconstruction and 
Reconstruction of Habeas, 78 S. CAL. L. REV. 1125 (2005). 
28. On appellate review of pretrial rulings in criminal cases, see 15B CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, 
ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE 2D § 3919 
(2d ed. 1991). 
29. Scott Campbell, Stephanie Roper, Wendy Preston, Louarna Gillis, and Nila Lynn Crime 
Victims‘ Rights Act, tit. I, Pub. L. No. 108-405, 118 Stat. 2261 (2004) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. § 3771 (2006)). 
30. See Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, tit. I, 
§ 101, 110 Stat. 1214, 1217 (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d)(1) (2006)). 
31. See Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 240, 266 (2005).  One such case has been twice 
remanded to the Fifth Circuit.  Penry v. Lynaugh (Penry I), 492 U.S. 302, 340 (1989); Penry v. 
Johnson (Penry II), 532 U.S. 782, 804 (2001). 
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But the Court has also been quick to punish habeas corpus petitioners for 
procedural fumbles, and thus shield the courts of appeals from the burden of 
hearing their petitions.  For example, the fact that a federal judge, in the 
presence of the state‘s attorney, informed a petitioner that he would have until 
Friday to file an appeal, did not excuse the petitioner‘s failure to file on 
Tuesday, which was in fact the statutory deadline.
32
 
But even as we Great Society folk conferred in San Diego in 1975, two 
other evolutions were in full swing and already challenging the ability and 
suitability of the courts of appeals to perform the tasks of correcting errors in 
criminal proceedings and assure us that the rights of accused persons and 
crime victims were being appropriately observed.  We conferees were then 
fully aware of both of these trends. 
One trend was a growing use of federal criminal law to regulate more 
forms of misconduct, most notably in regard to the sale and use of ―controlled 
substances,‖ resulting in ever-increasing criminal dockets in federal district 
courts and appellate caseloads in the courts of appeals.  That effort had 
commenced in 1909 but was not declared a war on drugs until 1970.
33
  As a 
―war‖ it was lost long ago,34 but its costs to the legal system continue.  Its 
continuing enlargement increased the federal criminal caseload and pressed 
judges to abbreviate the attention they gave to criminal appeals.  Meador, 
Rosenberg, and I observed in 1976: 
What we have articulated as the imperatives of appellate 
justice stand in the way of many procedures that would 
heighten efficiency.  In their commendable efforts to stay 
abreast of unprecedented workloads, some appellate courts 
have gone too far in curtailing oral argument, bypassing 
conferences, and deciding appeals with unexplained orders.
35
 
There was also another evolution underway in 1976 that tended to demean 
the task of correcting and thus preventing errors in the enforcement of 
criminal law.  It was the increasing tendency of United States circuit judges to 
invest their efforts in opportunities to make national law as expressed in 
published opinions of the court.  Indeed, our legal institutions and profession 
were becoming increasingly committed to the idea that the primary 
 
32. Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205, 207–08, 214 (2007); see also Scott Dodson, Mandatory 
Rules, 61 STAN. L. REV. 1, 6–8 (2008). 
33. For an account, see DOUGLAS VALENTINE, THE STRENGTH OF THE WOLF: THE SECRET 
HISTORY OF AMERICA‘S WAR ON DRUGS (2004); see also Opium Exclusion Act, Pub. L. No.  
60-221, 35 Stat. 614 (1909). 
34. JAMES P. GRAY, WHY OUR DRUG LAWS HAVE FAILED AND WHAT WE CAN DO ABOUT IT: 
A JUDICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE WAR ON DRUGS 13 (2001). 
35. CARRINGTON ET AL., supra note 14, at 41. 
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professional mission of appellate judges is to make law as illuminated in the 
signed and published opinions of their courts.
36
 
At least in the federal system, as a consequence of these two foreseen and 
continuing developments, the humble tasks of correcting the errors of lower 
courts and certifying the quality of justice provided there were no longer 
deemed to be primary, or even important, missions of federal appellate judges.  
This role transformation was confirmed by the creation of the en banc hearing 
designed to produce opinions expressing the ―law of the circuit.‖37  Writing 
opinions became the dominant mission of the circuit judges.  A difficult moral 
and ethical challenge is posed for a federal circuit judge who assigns to 
himself professional responsibility for the correctness of every judgment that 
he is called upon to review.
38
 
Certainly, the Supreme Court of the United States is a negative role model 
for the lower courts in this respect, dismissive as it is of most of its potential 
workload.  The Justices are increasingly relaxed in choosing to review fewer 
and fewer cases, writing longer and longer opinions declaratory of their 
shared views on national policies, and enjoying more time away from their 
professional duties.  In 1925, the Supreme Court was deciding roughly 300 
appeals a year;
39
 it is now down to as few as 87.
40
  Never mind conflicts in the 
laws of the circuit.  Let troublesome questions of national law percolate in the 
circuits
41
 perhaps indefinitely, or at least until those questions attract the 
interest of at least four Justices
42




36. For an economic analysis of this evolution, see Steven Shavell, On the Design of the 
Appeals Process: The Optimal Use of Discretionary Review Versus Direct Appeal, 39 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 63 (2010). 
37. A. Lamar Alexander, Jr., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts of Appeals: 
Accommodating Institutional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. REV. 563, 582 (1965); Paul D. 
Carrington, Crowded Dockets and the Courts of Appeals: The Threat to the Function of Review and 
the National Law, 82 HARV. L. REV. 542, 580–81 (1969); see Henry J. Friendly, The “Law of the 
Circuit” and All That, 46 ST. JOHN‘S L. REV. 406 (1972). 
38. See Stephen B. Burbank, Judicial Accountability to the Past, Present, and Future: 
Precedent, Politics and Power, 28 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L. REV. 19, 46 (2005); Alex Kozinski, The 
Real Issues of Judicial Ethics, 32 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1095 (2004).  But see B.E. WITKIN, MANUAL ON 
APPELLATE COURT OPINIONS § 10, at 14–17 (1977). 
39. FRANKFURTER & LANDIS, supra note 20, at 301 n.2, 302 tbl.I (showing 209 cases disposed 
of by written opinion and 83 per curiam decisions). 
40. JAMES C. DUFF, ADMIN. OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, 2009 ANNUAL REPORT OF THE 
DIRECTOR: JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURTS 80 tbl.A-1 (2010) [hereinafter 2009 
U.S. COURTS REPORT].  This is the number of cases argued during the 2008 term.  The number may 
be higher for the 2009 term. 
41. For a favorable assessment of this scheme, see generally Arthur D. Hellman, Light on a 
Darkling Plain: Intercircuit Conflicts in the Perspective of Time and Experience, 1998 SUP. CT. REV. 
247 (1998); see also Arthur D. Hellman, Never the Same River Twice: The Empirics and 
Epistemology of Intercircuit Conflicts, 63 U. PITT. L. REV. 81, 92–106 (2001). 
42. SUP. CT. R. 10.  While the Rules do not indicate the precise methodology for granting 
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Perhaps I exaggerate the degree to which circuit judges adhere to the role 
model the Justices provide.
44
  I have not myself been sitting on any appellate 
court.  But my clear sense is that the task of correcting errors in trial courts, or 
in courts of first instance as Europeans tend to designate them, is a task 
increasingly deemed unworthy of the attention of federal circuit judges.  The 
task seems one to be delegated, if possible, to staff lawyers or law clerks 
holding no commissions to make judicial decisions and who are anonymous 
in the sense that they take no public responsibility for their work.  On that 
account, the eminent Circuit Judge Donald Lay was moved to urge that 
federal appellate jurisdiction be made entirely discretionary,
45
 as it is in state 
courts in Virginia and West Virginia.
46
  Professor Steven Shavell, calling 
attention to the costs savings to all involved, proposes that appellants be 
allowed to confer such discretion on the appellate court.
47
 
My impression that our appellate courts have become entranced with their 
lawmaking role and repelled from their mundane and routine error-correction 
role was reinforced by discussions at the 2005 conference of state and federal 
appellate judges conducted by the American Academy of Appellate 
Lawyers.
48
  Many federal circuit judges appeared to be invigorated by the 
importance of their duty to make the law of the circuit
49—the role delegated to 
them by a Supreme Court that has forsaken its own longstanding 




certiorari, a minimum of four Justices must agree to grant certiorari.  For an explanation and 
discussion of the origins of the ―Rule of Four,‖ see Richard L. Revesz & Pamela S. Karlan, 
Nonmajority Rules and the Supreme Court, 136 U. PA. L. REV. 1067, 1068–73 (1988). 
43. TODD C. PEPPERS, COURTIERS OF THE MARBLE PALACE: THE RISE AND INFLUENCE OF 
THE SUPREME COURT LAW CLERK 191–205 (2006); ARTEMUS WARD & DAVID L. WEIDEN, 
SORCERERS‘ APPRENTICES: 100 YEARS OF LAW CLERKS AT THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
109–49 (2006). 
44. But see RICHARD A. POSNER, THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 102–09 (1985). 
45. Donald P. Lay, A Proposal for Discretionary Review in Federal Courts of Appeals, 34 SW. 
L.J. 1151, 1155 (1981). 
46. The Supreme Court of Virginia does not allow an appeal of right except under limited 
circumstances.  Virginia Courts in Brief, http://www.courts.state.va.us/courts/cib.pdf (last visited 
June 16, 2010); the Supreme Court of Appeals, West Virginia‘s only appellate court, has entirely 
discretionary review. The West Virginia Judicial System, http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/  
wvsystem.htm (last visited June 16, 2010). 
47. Shavell, supra note 36, at 70–75. 
48. For an account of the conference program, see Arthur D. Hellman, The View from the 
Trenches: A Report on the Breakout Sessions at the 2005 National Conference on Appellate Justice, 
8 J. APP. PRAC. & PROCESS 141 (2006). 
49. See Lauren K. Robel, Caseload and Judging: Judicial Adaptation to Caseload , 1990 BYU 
L. REV. 3, 44–47 (1990); THOMAS E. BAKER, RATIONING JUSTICE ON APPEAL: THE PROBLEMS OF 
THE U.S. COURTS OF APPEALS 34–37 (1994); POSNER, supra note 44, at 151–52. 
50. See Thomas E. Baker & Douglas D. McFarland, The Need for a New National Court, 100 
HARV. L. REV. 1400, 1406 (1987); COMM‘N ON STRUCTURAL ALTERNATIVES FOR THE FED. 
COURTS OF APPEALS, FINAL REPORT (1998). 
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to assure, for example, that we all pay the same taxes.
51
  Often to be heard at 
the 2005 conference were judicial expressions of disdain for many of the 
cases judges are expected to decide which they deem unworthy of their 
attention.  Many attributed the lengths of their dockets to the neglect or 
incompetence of counsel. 
The attraction of appellate judges to their lawmaking role is not, to be 
sure, a novelty discovered in the late twentieth century.  That impulse to make 
law and public policy can be identified with the origins of the common law 
tradition in which explicit legislation was largely absent.  But English 
common law judges did not write and publish opinions of their courts; they 
expressed their views of the law only orally and individually.  It was the 
Marshall Court in 1801 that introduced the concept of the opinion of the Court 
as an institutionalized statement signed and published by some or all the 
Justices to overtly prescribe legal principles to govern the future conduct of 
officials and citizens.
52
  It did not thereafter take long for American 
electorates to recognize that their judges were competing with elected 
legislatures for the role of sovereign lawmaker.  One response was the 
revision of state constitutions to provide for the election of judges.
53
  If the 
people were to presume to govern themselves, they would have to govern 
their judges.  In many states, we elect our judges because we know that they 
make as well as enforce our law.  Elected judges publish opinions of the court 
in part to validate their elections. 
The nineteenth century in the United States was also a time of continuous 
debate over codification.  David Dudley Field was a leader of those who 
favored comprehensive codification
54
 similar to the European civil law 
 
51. See Erwin N. Griswold, The Need for a Court of Tax Appeals, 57 HARV. L. REV. 1153, 
1158–64 (1944). 
52. The first appearance of the opinion of the Court came in the first decision rendered after the 
appointment of Chief Justice John Marshall.  The story is told in GEORGE LEE HASKINS & 
HERBERT A. JOHNSON, FOUNDATIONS OF POWER: JOHN MARSHALL, 1801–15, at 382–87 (1981).  
There was a precedent for such a device in the opinions of the Privy Council giving advice to the 
Crown, but the Council was not primarily a judicial institution, at least until the Privy Council 
Appeals Act of 1832.  2 & 3 Will. 4, c. 92 (Eng.); SELECT COMM. ON THE APPELLATE JURISDICTION, 
REPORT, 1872, H.L., at 27 (1872); see generally John P. Dawson, The Privy Council and Private Law 
in the Tudor and Stuart Period (pt. II), 48 MICH. L. REV. 627 (1950). 
53. ARNDT M. STICKLES, THE CRITICAL COURT STRUGGLE IN KENTUCKY 1819–1829 (1929); 
FREDERICK GRIMKE, THE NATURE AND TENDENCY OF FREE INSTITUTIONS 444–75 (John William 
Ward ed., 1968); EVAN HAYNES, THE SELECTION AND TENURE OF JUDGES 80 (1944) (―[W]ithin a 
short twenty years, the states of this Union, taken as a whole, abandoned the practice of the rest of 
the civilized world, and amended their constitutions so as to provide for popular election of judges, to 
hold office for short terms of years.‖).  For details, see HAYNES, supra, at 101–35. 
54. See David Dudley Field, Reasons for Adoption of the Codes (Feb. 19, 1873), in 
1 SPEECHES, ARGUMENTS, AND MISCELLANEOUS PAPERS OF DAVID DUDLEY FIELD 361, 361, 365–
66 (A.P. Sprague ed., New York, D. Appleton & Co. 1884). 
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tradition so that elected legislators would make the most of the law.
55
  The 
anti-codification position was advanced by the professional elite, including 
James Coolidge Carter
56
 and James Barr Ames,
57
 who supposed that wiser and 
more coherent law could, and would, evolve from the published opinions of 
appellate judges unobstructed by clumsy statutory texts crafted by common 
folk.  Theirs was a position that fit with the ambitions of the emerging 
organized bar and the nascent legal academy; it served to justify not only their 
existence as learned professionals and scholars, but also their claim to 
elevated status.  Enthusiasm for judicial lawmaking was surely reinforced by 
the case method of teaching law advanced by Christopher Columbus Langdell 
in the last decades of the nineteenth century.
58
  In the view thus advanced, 
well-educated and professionally disciplined lawyers can be expected to make 
better national law, one judicial opinion at a time, than can mere lay 
congressmen.  A secondary consequence of this infectious disdain of the 
democratic legislative process is that it distracts appellate judges from their 
primary but more mundane task of correcting errors committed by lower 
courts. 
Indeed, by the second half of the twentieth century, our judiciary could be 
seen as ―the ‗ascendant‘ branch‖59 of the federal government.  For the most 
part, mistrust and disdain of legislative enactments, and confidence in the 
wisdom and integrity of the judiciary and the elite profession of which it is a 
part, emerged as a central and defining feature of our national legal system.  
Understandably, therefore, the lawmaking duty is an article of faith for 
American appellate judges, and it seriously diminishes their interest in and 
commitment to their duties as error correctors. 
Associated, perhaps inevitably, with that diminution has been the 
contemporaneous decline in the concern even of trial judges for getting the 
disputed facts right, and assuring the public that they have done so.  The ADR 
movement,
60
 with its commitment to privacy in the resolution of disputes, has 
perhaps contributed to this evolution away from transparency in public 
 
55. Michael E. Tigar, Comment, Automatic Extinction of Cross-Demands: Compensatio from 
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56. See Lewis A. Grossman, Langdell Upside-Down: James Coolidge Carter and the 
Anticlassical Jurisprudence of Anticodficiation, 19 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 149, 151–52 (2007). 
57. Ames opposed the Uniform Negotiable Instruments Law and maybe the formation of the 
Commission on Uniform State Laws.  See James Barr Ames, The Negotiable Instruments Law, 
14 HARV. L. REV. 241 (1900). 
58. See ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE 1850S 
TO THE 1980S, at 51–63 (2001). 
59. Marcia Coyle, Court Is the “Ascendant” Branch, For Now, NAT‘L L.J., Aug. 6, 2001, at C7 
(quoting Seth Waxman, former Solicitor General of the United States). 
60. See Deborah R. Hensler, Our Courts, Ourselves: How the Alternative Dispute Resolution 
Movement Is Re-Shaping Our Legal System, 108 PENN ST. L. REV. 165 (2003). 
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adjudication.  Others have vigorously protested the vanishing trial.
61
  The 
public trial was and remains the primary instrument of public accountability.
62
  
The public could attend trials, see legal decision making, and know who was 
personally responsible for judgments, whether civil or criminal.  And it was 
afforded at least some access to the error-correction process through public 
appellate hearings and published opinions.  Alas, the absence of such public 
proceedings leaves us without such knowledge.  We should worry about that. 
At least in federal courts, final judgments are now often largely the work 
product of a bureaucracy.
63
  The chambers of federal district judges have 
expanded to make room for an array of others, including law clerks, staff 
lawyers, and magistrate judges, who were not appointed by the President nor 
confirmed by the Senate, but who do much of their court‘s work.  The visible 
deed of the judge, if any, is often limited to a mere signature accepting the 
recommendations and legal opinions expressed by lesser officers of the 
judicial staff.
64
  Indeed, the Supreme Court has approved the use of party-
drafted findings of fact in civil cases, so that all a judge need do to dispose of 
many cases is just say yes and sign his or her name.
65
 
Similar delegations are made by circuit judges to their law clerks and to 
growing central staffs.  Their decisions are often unpublished and even 
unsigned.  This trend, already visible in 1975, was a subject of regret to our 
Advisory Council.
66
  Owen Fiss in 1983 captured the concern by linking it to 
Hannah Arendt‘s concern about a social order subject to ―Rule by Nobody.‖67  
Judge Harry Edwards, in response to this concern, offered a reassurance that 
the quality of judicial work is not impaired by the use of talented law clerks, 
but he acknowledged that at some point, excessive delegation of judicial 
power undermines public confidence in the institutions.
68
  And the measures 
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of delegation to central staff seem steadily to have increased since his 
reassurance,
69
 steadily diminishing the professional responsibility, moral duty, 
and individual accountability of the appellate judge.  As Fiss noted, this trend 
corresponds to similar trends in other institutions, private as well as public. 
While our federal district and circuit courts have become increasingly 
bureaucratized in their administration of private civil, as well as criminal, law, 
that trend appears to be stronger in federal criminal proceedings.  A radical 
transformation of the legal process in criminal cases was achieved by 
congressional enactments specifying and lengthening the sentences to be 
imposed on convicted persons and providing more complex degrees of 
criminality,
70
 thus establishing very strong inducements to the negotiation of 
guilty pleas.
71
  Convictions resting on guilty pleas of course lack transparency 
and afford little basis for the exercise of appellate jurisdiction.  It is 
increasingly a brave accused who denies guilt and demands the right to a 
public trial, whether by a judge or a jury. 
The discretion of the district judge in sentencing was partially restored in 
2005 by the Supreme Court,
72
 but the statutory Federal Sentencing Guidelines 
still confine the choices open to the sentencing judge.
73
  Appeals protesting 
excessive sentences are common, but the prosecution may also appeal a 
sentence it deems too light.
74
  An ―abuse of discretion‖ standard is applied.  
The degree of adherence to the Guidelines varies among districts and between 
circuits.
75
  It seems fair to say that the role of the courts of appeals is modest, 
and seldom is the occasion for transparent public proceedings. 
Our 1975 National Advisory Council on Appellate Justice was aware of, 
and resistant to, the trend of appellate judges to focus an ever-greater share of 
energy and intellect on their politically engaged lawmaking function, to the 
detriment of their error-correction functions.  We were also aware of the 
growing tendency of Congress to enact more and more criminal laws as 
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240–41 (4th ed. Supp. 2008). 
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expressions of their disapproval of conduct deemed to be antisocial.
76
  We 
were striving to resist the manifest effects of these developments on our 
shared aim of assuring transparency and accountability in the law enforcement 
process. 
It is fair to say that in our time, we lost.  The vanishing trial has been 
accompanied by the vanishing appellate hearing,
77
 and even perhaps the 
vanishing review by judges of the enforcement of federal criminal law.  But 
the need abides for transparency and public accountability of the appellate 
judges responsible for correcting the errors of our former ―trial‖ courts in the 
administration of criminal laws.  That transparency is needed to provide 
public assurance that our laws are being faithfully enforced by those 
appointed or elected to enforce them.  In this statement, I adhere to a view 
expressed with Meador and Rosenberg in 1976, to wit, that 
The central purpose of a criminal appeal is to insure that the 
trial court decision was reached fairly and accurately.  The 
lack of precise uniformity in doctrinal application, though not 
unimportant, is relatively of less concern.  The appellate 
court‘s mission is to provide assurance that the defendant was 
convicted and sentenced on adequate evidence and without 
prejudicial error at trial or in the preliminary proceedings.  In 
short, the chief function of a criminal appeal is to see that the 
appellant was not done an injustice.
78
 
We were of course fully aware in 1976, as we are today, that many 
criminal appeals are hopeless.  A trial judge at our 1975 conference offered an 
example we all considered and discussed.  He described an appellant who 
argued that a conviction should be reversed because the national flag was not 
on display in the courtroom at the time of trial.  And then, the informing judge 
reported, counsel went on to advance his weaker arguments.  How long, the 
question was posed, should appellate judges, otherwise burdened with 
important public responsibilities as lawmakers, have to listen to such trivial 
arguments? 
Our answer then, and my answer now, is, not long, but long enough.  
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Long enough to demonstrate to the world that someone appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate has heard and understood the 
substance of the appellant‘s contention.  Long enough to assure us that 
responsibility for the decision has not been delegated to anonymous staff.  
And that the judges appointed to perform the duty have, as we used to say, 
―stood up in front of God and everybody‖ to say that, yes, this conviction was 
correct.  That should not take long.  But it is not a duty adequately performed 
merely by an instantaneous response or signature made on the advice of staff.  
Responding to that challenge, the late, great Circuit Judge Richard Arnold,
79
 
sadly remarked that possessing 98% confidence that a case was rightly 




The Supreme Court in 1967 had of course held that counsel for a criminal 
appellant could acknowledge the absence of a plausible argument for reversal, 
but only by means of a legal brief explaining the absence.
81
  That practice 
appears to abide.
82
  But it is still a task for the appellate court to review that 
brief, and staff can help.  Several sitting judges reported to our Advisory 
Council in 1975 that they had reversed convictions notwithstanding Anders 
briefs filed to concede the cases.
83
  Whether the problems presented to counsel 
appointed to appeal a hopeless case have since been resolved, it cannot be that 
we have since found a means of disposing of hopeless criminal appeals 
without the need for the public engagement of the court as advocated for by 
the Advisory Council and advanced in our 1976 work. 
The public interest continues to call for public exposure and 
accountability, and therefore requires some form of oral argument in every 
criminal appeal.
84
  As Michael and Jane Tigar have affirmed, ―[o]ral argument 
is always important and should never be waived.‖85  Given modern 
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technologies, appellant‘s counsel need not come to the courthouse.86  The 
argument can be conducted electronically on a computer screen.  But counsel, 
or even a pro se appellant, seeking reversal should be required to state the 
argument for reversal on the record and in a forum exposed to public scrutiny.  
And at least one appellate judge should be seen, electronically if need be, 
responding to the appellant‘s argument and taking personal responsibility for 
any summary disposition.  Thus, the lawyer making the sappy argument about 
the absence of the flag in the courtroom, or one arguing that his case is 
hopeless, should be obliged to present that argument or conclusion in person, 
however shamefully, by a visible, transparent means.  A real appellate judge, 
one appointed by the President and confirmed by the Senate, should be 
available publicly to ask counsel for a citation to a law requiring such a flag in 
the courtroom before dismissing the appeal. 
As our Great Society gang conceded decades ago, hopeless appeals should 
not command full or prolonged attention.  But the designation of an appeal as 
unworthy of serious attention by judges is a decision not properly delegated 
entirely to staff.  And if an argument on the merits is advanced, it is 
imperative that real judges be seen to hear and consider it. 
We Great Society law reformers did see the need for support staff to 
manage the flood of criminal appeals pursued by the new generation of 
appointed defense counsel.  Indeed, an important and recognized function of 
support staff would be to provide quality control for appointed counsel, i.e., to 
alert judges to inadequacies of performance by defense counsel, especially 
those filing Anders briefs explaining their inability to make a serious 
argument for reversal. 
Thus, the central question I mean to propose for the twenty-first century is 
whether, in federal courts, minimum standards of transparency and public 
accountability are met in the resolution of criminal appeals.  Are we assured 
that convictions have been carefully and conscientiously reviewed by one or 
more United States circuit judges who have taken personal responsibility for 
affirmation of every conviction? 
Can one circuit judge represent her court in transparently affirming a 
conviction?  I insist only on the absolute minimum of one such visible hearing 
officer.  On this point, I recall my 1969 dispute with the late Bernard Segal, 
then the president of the ABA, who chaired the advisory committee on the 
Bar Foundation study I was conducting.  Bernie advised that an oral argument 
before two circuit judges would suffice to meet minimal standards of 
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As you see, I am now down to one.  I can abide a process of review by one 
member of the court of appeals if she (1) is actively and openly engaged in 
responding to the appellant‘s arguments and (2) is empowered then to submit 
the recorded public presentation to two colleagues who share responsibility 
for the appellate disposition and who might possibly reopen the oral argument 
if substantial issues are presented. 
What we sought decades ago was assurance of transparency and 
accountability in a process of adjudication of guilt.
88
  I adhere to that purpose 
and continue to oppose practices allowing criminal appeals to be papered over 
by staff work so that those appointed by the President and confirmed by the 
Senate give no more than glancing attention to the question of whether a 
proceeding resulting in a conviction was properly conducted.  It seems fair to 
say that most federal criminal cases are no longer adjudicated but are resolved 
by informal bargaining in a bureaucratic process.  In deploring this 
development, I do no more than repeat the thoughts of wise circuit judges who 
have publicly protested the deterioration of the federal appellate process.
89
 
But let us not stop there.  One should not be permitted to address issues of 
criminal procedure without noting the demerits of our substantive criminal 
law.  The severity of the sentences prescribed by Congress that serve to 
compel plea bargaining is highly objectionable, especially those severe 
sentences imposed for violations of criminal laws imposed to control 
substances.  Congress seems too far removed from community life to 
appreciate the human and family consequences of such severe sentencing.  
We have, by far, more citizens in penitentiaries than any other nation.
90
  A 
high percentage of those in prison are there for non-violent crimes—generally 
for use or trafficking of substances that were lawful in the United States in the 
nineteenth century.
91
  These substances are, for most, less addictive than 
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cigarettes or whiskey and have been in use elsewhere for a thousand or more 
years.  Did we learn nothing from the national experience with the abolition of 
liquor?  Can we not resist the impulse to criminalize every form of conduct 
that a majority might strongly disapprove?  I am skeptical that we can 
establish a prudent and decent process of law enforcement as long as we insist 
on criminalizing moral principles that many do not share and will not accept. 
With that concession, I conclude that our commitment to due process and 
respect for the rights of citizens requires an appellate process in criminal cases 
that assures the public, as well as the accused, that our laws are being 
faithfully and correctly enforced by judges lawfully designated to bear 
responsibility for the laws‘ enforcement. 
 
 
of marijuana and the federal government‘s efforts to curtail its use).  
